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GRAND JURY SECRECY:
PLUGGING THE LEAKS IN AN EMPTY BUCKET
Daniel C. Richman*
Although people can quarrel about the significance or reliability of Independent
Counsel Kenneth Starr's investigative findings, no one can deny that his investiga-
tion produced new law. We now know that the attorney-client privilege survives
the death of the client,' that government lawyers may not rely on that privilege to
shield communications from their "client" relating to criminal misconduct,2 and
that there is no "protective function privilege" (at least not yet),3 While bringing
some clarity to certain areas, the Independent Counsel's investigation also high-
lighted the confused state of the law relating to Rule 6(e)'s grand jury secrecy
provisions.4
Emblematic of the confusion was the reaction to Starr's interview with Steven
* Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law. Between 1987 and 1992, 1 was an Assistant United
States Attorney in the Southern District of New York. Since then I have served as a consultant for the Office of the
Inspector General of the Justice Department, but nothing here directly relates to that work. Thanks to Alex Bowie,
Mike Bromwich, Jerry Lynch, Julie O'Sullivan, Dave Sklansky, and Bill Stuntz for their generous and valuable
assistance.
1. See Swidler& Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998) (declaring that the privilege survives death of the
client).
2. See In re Bruce R. Lindsey (Grand Jury Testimony), 148 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466
(1998) (holding that there is no attorney-client privilege protecting communications between the President and
government lawyers).
3. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 461 (1998) (refusing to recognize a
protective function privilege covering Secret Service officers). A move to create a "protective function privilege"
by statute was pending in the last Congress. See Stephen Labaton, Testing of a President: The Supreme Court;
Administration Loses Two Legal Battles Against Starr, N.Y. TIEs, Nov. 10, 1998, at A27.
4. Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in pertinent part,
(2) General Rule of Secrecy. A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a
recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or
any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(A)(ii) of this subdivision shall not
disclose matters occurring before the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules.
No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. A
knowing violation of Rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of court.
(3) Exceptions.
(A) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand jury, other
than its deliberations and the vote of any grand juror, may be made to
(i) an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such attorney's duty; and
(ii) such government personnel... as are deemed necessary by an attorney for the government to
assist an attorney for the government in the performance of such attorney's duty to enforce federal
criminal law.
FED. R. CriM. P. 6(e).
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Brill.5 After avowing that his office " 'never discussed grand jury proceedings,' "
Starr conceded that he and his deputy regularly gave "background" interviews to
reporters, but noted that " 'it is definitely not grand jury information, if you are
talking about what witnesses tell FBI agents or us before they testify before the
grand jury or about related matters.' ,7
Brill's article took Starr to task:
In fact, there are court decisions (including one in early May from the
Washington D.C. federal appeals court with jurisdiction over this Starr grand
jury) that have ruled explicitly that leaking information about prospective
witnesses who might testify at a grand jury, or about expected testimony, or
about negotiations regarding immunity for testimony, or about the strategy of a
grand jury proceeding all fall within [Rule 6(e)].8
The White House also seized on Starr's apparent confession, announcing that it
"raise[d] grave concerns about Mr. Starr's entire investigation." ' 9 Other commen-
tators soon came to Starr's defense, however, noting that the law is not at all clear
on these points.'0
The scope of Rule 6(e)'s secrecy requirement is uncertain on other issues as
well. For example, should documents produced to the grand jury under the
compulsion of subpoena be considered "matters occurring before the grand jury"
within the meaning of the rule? More than sixteen years ago, one district court
observed: "There is an abundance of cases which address this question with a
striking lack of unanimity."" And this lack of unanimity continues today.'
2
5. Steven Brill, Pressgare, BRiLt's CoNrNrr 123, 132 (August 1998).
6. Id.
7. Id. (emphasis in original).
8. Id.; see In re Motions of Dow Jones & Co., 142 F.3d 496,499-500 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (" '[M]atters occurring
before the grand jury'-includes not only what has occurred and what is occurring, but also what is likely to
occur. Encompassed within the rule of secrecy are 'the identities of witnesses or jurors, the substance of
testimony' as well as actual transcripts, 'the strategy or direction of the investigation, the deliberations or
questions of jurors, and the like.' "(quoting SEC v. Dresser Indus., 628 F.2d 1368, 1382 (D.C. 1980) (en banc));
Fund for Constitutional Gov't v. National Archives & Records Serv., 656 F.2d 856, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
9. Howard Kurtz, Starr Defends "Background" Talk; Prosecutor Says He, Top Aide Are Countering
"Misinformation," WASH. POST, June 14, 1998, at A10; see also Adam Clymer, Starr Admits Role in Leaks to
Press, N.Y Times, June 14, 1998, at Al (reporting the same story); Warren P. Strobel, Magazine Report Sets off
New White House Attack on Starr, WASH. TWMEs, June 15, 1998, at A16 (same).
10. See, e.g., Paul Elias, Media Starr: Did IC Break Ethical Rules?, THE RECORDER, June 16, 1998, at 5
(quoting commentators noting vagueness of the law); Ruth Marcus, Starr Defends Discussions With Reporters,
WASH. POST, June 16, 1998, atA8 (same); David E. Rovella, Lies, Not Leaks, Real Starr Issue?, NAT'L L.J., June
29, 1998, at Al (same); Stuart Taylor, Jr., Reach of Rule 6(e) Not Crystal Clear, N.Y. L.J., June 22, 1998, at 2
(same).
11. In re John Doe Grand Jury Proceedings, 537 F Supp. 1038, 1043 (D.R.I. 1982) (collecting cases); see also
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 851 F.2d 860, 863 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting diverse approaches).
12. See SARA SuN BEALE, WILLtsM C. BRYSON, JAMES E. FELMAN, & MICHAEL J. ELSTON, GRAND JuRY LAW
AND PRACTICE § 5:6, at 5-34 to -37 (2d ed. 1998); Preliminary Proceedings: Grand Jury, Twenty-Seventh Annual




Why is Rule 6(e) doctrine so unsettled on these and other basic issues? Two
quick answers spring to mind, one relating to the norms established by the rule; the
other, to the process by which those norms are articulated.
Rule 6(e) does not establish a general regime of investigative secrecy for
prosecutors and law enforcement agents. It addresses only what occurs "before the
grand jury." As a matter of physical reality, however, the only thing that clearly
occurs before a grand jury is testimony by a live witness, and sometimes the
introduction of exhibits. 13 Just about everything else generally occurs in a
prosecutor's office or out in the field: deliberations about what investigations the
grand jury will pursue, and which witnesses and documents will be subpoenaed in
its name; interviews of potential witnesses conducted with an eye to deciding
whether they will actually be brought before the grand jury, and receipt and review
of documents obtained via grand jury subpoena.' 4 Particularly when prosecutors
simultaneously develop a case in the grand jury and pursue other investigative
options without using the grand jury, the language of Rule 6(e) provides all too
little guidance as to what the government's secrecy obligations are. Left to their
own devices in defining the fiction of what occurs "before" the grand jury, courts
unsurprisingly reach different conclusions.
The second challenge to coherence in Rule 6(e) comes from the ways in which
litigation over the rule arises. The bitter debate touched off by Starr's "admis-
sions" 15 to Steven Brill highlights a more general point. The main reason why the
White House and its allies were so quick to seize on Starr's comments was that, in
the absence of a confession by a law enforcement source (or, even less likely, a
reporter with no interest in being a future beneficiary of leaked information 16 )
leaks are virtually impossible to prove. 7 Because of these proof problems, courts
considering leak allegations rarely have the kind of factual record they would need
to refine their doctrinal distinctions, and are tempted, in the absence of anyone to
sanction, to read Rule 6(e) broadly. In a very different line of cases-those
involving efforts by the government or a private party to use Rule 6(e) as a shield
to prevent the use of grand jury material in civil litigation-courts will have a more
complete record (albeit one usually provided ex parte), but the price of secrecy
13. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 851 F.2d at 863 ("It is common ground that testimony before a grand
jury is always... a 'matter' "within the meaning of Rule 6(e)).
14. The Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22, which requires that certain subpoenaed bank
records actually be presented to the grand jury, id. at § 3420(a)(1), highlights how subpoenaed documents may be
treated in the absence of such a statutory requirement.
15. After the Brill article, Starr issued a statement that "disputed none of the quotations in the article," but
avowed that Brill had " 'recklessly and irresponsibly charged the Office of Independent Counsel with improper
contacts with the media. These charges are false.' "Clymer, supra note 9, at Al.
16. See David Firestone, Steven Brill Strikes a Nerve in the News Media, N.Y. TIMEs, June 20, 1998, at A7
("One of the few things that most reporters regard as sacred is the protection of their sources.. .").
17. A state prosecutor cross-designated to work on the federal prosecution of John A. ("Junior") Gotti was
recently removed from the case after acknowledging improper press contacts. Al Guart, Prosecutor Booted Off
Gotti Case for Leaks, N.Y. PosT, Jan. 30, 1999, at 5.
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may be unfairness in the civil litigation. The shifting equities and institutional
interests 18 in these two very different contexts surely present a challenge to courts
trying to harmonize Rule 6(e) law.
These reasons have considerable explanatory power. However, the controversy
over Starr's conduct, and other disputed issues of 6(e) law, reflect a more
fundamental problem: the absence of a clear idea why a special regime of grand
jury secrecy is necessary. Confronting this problem means not only exploring the
uses and misuses of investigative information, but also asking uncomfortable
questions about who really is benefited by the existence of such a regime.
I. INVESTIGATIONS INSIDE THE GRAND JURY AND OUT
In the federal system, prosecution of all felonies must proceed by indictment (in
the absence of a waiver).' 9 All felony cases therefore must be presented to a grand
jury. But the nature of the grand jury's involvement with these cases varies greatly.
Roughly speaking, there are two kinds of cases: those in which the grand jury does
not play an important investigative role, and those in which it does (if only as a
source of authority).
Although hard empirical evidence is not available, the first category probably
includes the majority of federal criminal cases.20 Were one to review the grand jury
minutes in these cases, one would likely find the elicitation of hearsay testimony
from one or more government agents,21 followed by a request that the grand jury
return an indictment along the lines suggested by the prosecutor. The process
usually does not take very long, and just about always ends in the voting of a true
18. See BEALE, ETAL., supra note 12, § 5:1, at 5-4:
For prosecutors, grand jury secrecy is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, most prosecutors
seek to minimize the extent to which they must provide pretrial discovery of their case to the
defense. That interest compels prosecutors to urge a narrow interpretation of the principles of
grand jury secrecy, and a narrow construction of the statutory and court-made exceptions to those
principles. On the other hand, it is often in prosecutors' interest to divulge information obtained
through the grand jury process to parties not privy to the grand jury proceedings.... On those
occasions, prosecutors find themselves urging a broad interpretation of the exceptions to the
principles of grand jury secrecy.
Id.
19. See U.S. CONST., amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury .... "); FED. R. Cpim. P. 7(a) (codifying the rule that felony
prosecutions commence with an indictment).
20. Here, as in an number of other places in this essay, the support for the text's proposition comes from an
amalgam of personal experience, anecdote, and deduction. Would that it were otherwise. But perhaps the greatest
cost of grand jury secrecy rules is the lost opportunity for systematic study of the body.
21. The government may present hearsay evidence to the grand jury, see Costello v. United States, 350 U.S.
359, 363 (1956), and will often do so, because it facilitates the presentation of a seemless case, limits the burden
on non-government witnesses, and limits the effectiveness of cross-examination should the out-of-court
declarants later testify at trial. These are not necessarily good reasons, see Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries





Cases within this first category can differ greatly in the extent of prosecutorial
involvement prior to the grand jury presentation. Some investigations-often in
the narcotics or organized crime areas-will have required prosecutorial involve-
ment at an early stage, for instance, in order to obtain authorization for electronic
surveillance. 23 Most, though, will have been conducted by a law enforcement
agency without the assistance of a prosecutor, to whom the case will be presented
only when the agency cannot go further on its own.24 Regardless of when a
prosecutor enters the picture, however, the important thing about these investiga-
tions is that they will have been conducted without the coercive power of the grand
jury. Physical evidence will have been seized (pursuant to warrant or via an
investigative stop) or proffered. Some potential testimonial sources will have
provided information voluntarily-victims, concerned citizens, obliging institu-
tions (which can themselves benefit from having good relations with law enforc-
ers). Other sources will have complied only after some level of coercion has been
exerted. The coercion can be from a non-governmental entity, such as an employer
whose fear of corporate (or personal) sanctions leads it to put pressure on its
employees. But there are also direct governmental methods of coercion. Some-
times, law enforcement or regulatory agencies will have invoked administrative
subpoena power.25 The most important source of governmental coercion in these
cases, however, comes from the power to threaten prosecution (for either the crime
being investigated or some other crime, related or unrelated). This is the source of
pressure that results in cooperation agreements, "no pros letters" and other such
arrangements that promise leniency, or better, in exchange for information and,
sometimes, testimony.
26
In sum, when a grand jury's role in a case is limited to authorizing formal
charges, the government has a broad range of investigative options that allow it to
22. See id., at 274-75 (giving statistics regarding true bills); see also BLANcmE DAVIS BLANK, THE NOT So
GRAND JURY: THE STORY OF THE FEDERAL GRAND JuRY SYsTEm 31-42 (1993) (giving federal grand juror's account
of typical matters that came before her panel); id. at 37 (discussing variety of case she dubs the "fifteen minute
wonder"); Fred A. Bernstein, Note, Behind the Gray Door: W'illiams, Secrecy, and the Federal Grand Jury, 69
N.Y.U. L. REv. 563, 573 (1994) (citing one prosecutor who put his "record" at "[flifteen indictments in 45
minutes").
23. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1998) (governing authorizations for interception of wire, oral, or electronic
communications).
24. See Elizabeth Glazer, Thinking Strategically: How Federal Prosecutors Can Reduce Violent Crime, -
FORD. URBAN L. J. __ (1999) (forthcoming) (describing range of interaction between agents and prosecutors
during investigations).
25. See Graham Hughes, Administrative Subpoenas and the Grand Jury: Converging Streams of Criminal and
Civil Compulsory Process, 47 VAND. L. REv. 573 (1994) (discussing extent of cooperation between regulatory and
criminal enforcement agents).
26. See Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIo ST. L.J. 69 (1995) (discussing dynamics of
cooperation agreements and their negotiation); see also United States v. Singleton, 1999 WL 6469 (10th Cir.
1999) (holding that federal bribery statute does not prohibit the government from promising leniency in exchange
for testimony).
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obtain information from both the most obliging witnesses (e.g. victims) and those
who, because of criminal exposure, might otherwise be the least obliging. If, however, a
potential witness is either unwilling or unable to cooperate with the inquiry, and cannot
be credibly threatened with prosecution, a federal prosecutor will lack the ability to
compel disclosure on her own. Unlike their cousins across the Atlantic in Britain's
Serious Frauds Office,27 federal prosecutors do not have their own subpoena power, at
least as a general matter.28 They therefore must turn to the grand jury not only for
authorization of formal charges, but as a "source" of coercive power.29
Because of the limitations placed on prosecutorial power, investigations will be
pursued "in" the grand jury primarily in two sorts of situations. One occurs when
potential witnesses are legally obliged to keep information secret in the absence of
legal compulsion. 30 The other occurs when potential witnesses are reluctant to
come forward in the absence of subpoenae---either because they would prefer not
to give the government information, or because they would prefer not to be seen
doing so voluntarily-but are not so reluctant that they will be willing to perjure
themselves or go into contempt.3 1
Given the available options, it is not hard to see why a great many investigations
involving violent crimes or relatively low-level narcotics trafficking (without
money laundering) occur outside the grand jury. In these cases, the non-official
sources of information tend to be either obliging eyewitnesses or people who can
be credibly threatened with criminal prosecution. It is also not surprising that the
27. Under the Criminal Justice Act 1987 the director of the Serious Fraud Office may investigate any
suspected offence that appears on reasonable grounds to involve serious or complex fraud. The
SF0 may issue a notice requiring attendance of persons to answer questions. It is a criminal
offence not to answer questions without a reasonable excuse.
JANET DINE, CiIuiNAL LAW IN THE COMPANY CoNTEXT 176 (1995).
28. But see 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (1998) (authorizing the Attorney General or his designate independently to issue
subpoenae for documents (but not testimony) in connection with investigations "relating to any act or activity
involving a Federal health care offense"); see also BEALE, ET AL., supra note 12, § 6:3.1.
Those who dismiss the grand jury as a rubber stamp for prosecutors and who would, but for its constitutional
basis, eliminate it in the federal system often forget that the alternative, with respect to the grand jury's
investigative functions is more likely to be not judicial supervision but prosecutorial subpoena power. See
William J. Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. Cium. L. & Criminology 174, 180 (1973) (suggesting that
grand juries be eliminated, and that their subpoena power be given to prosecutors).
29. Strictly speaking, the coercive power underlying a grand jury subpoena comes from a court, not the grand
jury itself. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 48 (1992) ("[TIhe grand jury cannot compel the
appearance of witnesses and the production of evidence, and must appeal to the court when such compulsion is
required." (citing Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1959))). The point is, though, that a prosecutor can
invoke compulsory processes in the grand jury's name that she could not obtain in her own right.
30. See, e.g., Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22 (1998) (barring financial institutions from
providing consumer financial records to government except under certain specified circumstances, including
when subpoenaed by a grand jury).
31. A grand jury subpoena will also generally be the only mechanism by which a prosecutor can obtain the
testimony of a witness who invokes a valid Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 6001-6003 (1998) (setting out procedures for grants of immunity and compulsion orders).
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greatest use of grand juries as investigative tools is in the white collar area, where
potential witnesses frequently operate within an institutional context that both
requires the threat of legal sanction as a means of obtaining testimony, and takes
that threat seriously.32 Indeed, even when the government can show probable
cause to support a search warrant, it will frequently proceed via subpoena in a
white-collar case. This forbearance arises in part out of courtesy for opposing
counsel, but it also is based on enforcers' confidence that this level of compulsion
will be sufficient, given the targets and the nature of the evidence involved.33
I. INVESTIGATIVE SECRECY
There are, of course, good reasons for keeping all investigative information
secret pre-indictment (and after, too34), regardless of the extent to which the
inquiry has been pursued in the grand jury. Some of these reasons give enforcers
(prosecutors and agents) powerful institutional incentives for maintaining secrecy.
Premature disclosure of investigative data-identity of targets, nature of allega-
tions, nature of proof--can lead targets to flee, destroy evidence, intimidate or
deter witness, create phony evidence, and otherwise impede investigations.35 Even
disclosures that do not trigger obstructionary behavior can impede the govern-
ment's investigatory powers by drying up information sources that rely on the
promise or assumption of confidentiality. So compelling are these concerns that
they have been successfully used in the federal system to justify not merely a
regime of investigative secrecy pre-indictment, but also a regime of minimal
discovery post-indictment.36
Premature disclosure of investigative data can have other adverse consequences
of which enforcers might (regrettably) be somewhat less mindful. As an FBI agent
once noted: "There can be no clearer example of an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy than to release to the public that another individual was the
32. Organized crime cases are not so easily categorized. Some, of the family feud variety, for instance, may
look much like other violent crime cases. Probes into mob infiltration of "legitimate" business, on the other hand,
will have much in common with white collar cases.
33. Proceeding by subpoena, rather than search warrant, will draw defense counsel into the process of sifting
through documents, a process that might otherwise be quite onerous for a prosecutor in a white-collar case
involving cartloads of documents. This involvement can make a prosecutor's life much easier, particularly when
she has confidence in counsel's integrity, and the cost-materials withheld based on aggressive invocations of
privilege-will not be obvious.
34. An indictment does not end Rule 6(e)'s rule of secrecy. See, e.g., Hiss v. Dep't of Justice, 441 F. Supp. 69,
71 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (denying historians access to materials from grand jury investigation conducted thirty-years
earlier); see also Benjamin Weiser, Request for Hiss Grand Jury Records, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 16, 1998, at B5.
However, my interest in investigative leaks leads me to focus only on pre-indictment secrecy.
35. Not all of the defensive measures a target might take are necessarily illegal. See KENNETH MANN,
DEFENDiNG WImT-CoA.iR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATORNEYS AT WORK 5 (1985) (stating that "central theme of
the white-collar crime defense function" is effort of defense attorney "to keep potential evidence out the
government's reach by controlling access to information").
36. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JaOLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 844 (2d ed. 1992) (stating that "[t]he
Federal Rules model... provides the standard for the narrowest range of prosecution disclosure...").
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subject of an FBI investigation."' 37 Such disclosures can threaten the privacy and
reputations of information sources as well.
Notwithstanding these compelling arguments for secrecy, there are correspond-
ing reasons why enforcers might want to leak or otherwise disclose investigative
data in particular cases.38 Because leaks are so hard to prove, any effort to canvas
rationales is bound to rest on hypothetical or anecdote. But some basic possibilities
emerge. Sometimes, disclosure-whether through the press or through more
targeted means-will actually further an investigation. Selective disclosure of
investigative information can place members of a targeted enterprise in a non-
custodial "prisoner's dilemma," giving each person reason to fear that one or more
of his comrades will race to the prosecutor's office to betray him in exchange for
leniency, and therefore giving him reason to get there first. 39 Disclosure can also
prod non-culpable people into providing new information, by triggering memo-
ries, or by merely assuring them that the government is pursuing a case. Informa-
tion can even serve as a sort of currency. Leaks to the media in one case can help
foster the sort of "working relationship"4 that leads reporters to reciprocate with
information in another case.
The desire to advance an investigation is not the only institutional reason
enforcers might have to disseminate investigative information. Prosecutors or law
enforcement agencies may find it politically desirable to assure the public that a
particular target or crime is being investigated, to deter others from pursuing the
kind of conduct being investigated, to show appropriators that they are getting
their money's worth-in short, to justify their existence without waiting for
charges to be brought and disposed of.41 It is worth noting that, to the extent
37. Fund for Constitutional Gov't v. Nat'l Archives & Records Serv., 656 F2d 856, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
38. The problem is not limited to the law enforcement context. See SissELA BOK, SEcRErs 217 (1982) (noting
that "[w]ith modern governments guarding vast amounts of information, much of it inaccessible to the public or
actively kept secret, and with the media eager to circulate newsworthy revelations to vast audiences, the leak...
has become an important tool of governing."); Note, Keeping Secrets: Congress, The Courts, and National
Security Information, 103 HARV. L. REv. 906, 911 (1990) (observing that "administration officials selectively
release some information in order to generate needed public support for administration policies, or to satisfy more
parochial bureaucratic or personal motives").
39. See Richman, supra note 26, at 89-91; see also Wn.LtAM POuNDSToNE, PRusoNan's DILEMMA 118 (1992);
William Glaberson, Psst, Says Prosecutor to Reporter; I'm All Ears, Is the Reply, N.Y. Twis, June 24, 1998, at
A22 ("A startling news report can signal the strength of a case and persuade a defendant to testify against others.
In the insider trader cases that rocked Wall Street in the 1980's, a drumbeat of news reports appeared to help
persuade traders and investment bankers to turn on one another."); United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 582
(2d Cir. 1988) (finding evidence that "the government persistently leaked information about the grand jury
proceedings to the press ... both to induce the cooperation of potential witnesses and to supplant state
prosecutorial efforts in a bureaucratic turf fight").
40. Scott M. Matheson, Jr., The Prosecutor the Press, and Free Speech, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 865, 889 (1990)
(stating that "[aIttomeys may ... be motivated by a desire to establish and foater a satisfactory working
relationship with the press").
41. See also Glaberson, supra note 39 (according to some former prosecutors, "mid-level prosecutors or
investigators... may hope to goad superiors to be more aggressive in an investigation or to make their agencies
look good").
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pre-indictment leaks can be seen as an institutional effort to collect on the capital
created by enforcement activity, agencies, whose conspicuous involvement in a
case often ends when arrests are made, may have greater motivation to leak than
prosecutors, who will take center stage during all phases of the adjudicatory
process. Enforcers might have uglier institutional motives as well-a desire to
enhance the likelihood of a future conviction by tainting a jury pool,42 or to impose
a reputational penalty on a target regardless of a trial's outcome.
Enforcers may also leak information for reasons that have nothing to do with
furthering the interests (or perceived interests) of their government offices or
agencies. Self-interest is quite enough. Prosecutors seeking political advance may
want to burnish their image in the press.43 Others might want the publicity that will
help them "secure private sector legal employment and clients sometime in the
future," or that will simply enhance their community status.' Law enforcement
agents might be a little more immune to this economic temptation, since there is
less of a private market for them to cash in on publicity (though the recent
proliferation of top drawer investigative firms45 may be changing this).
Ill. SECRECY REGULATION
One response to the risks that the public good of investigative security will be
frittered away for inappropriate, or even private, purposes would be to develop a
robust legal regime for regulating the release of all investigative information-a
regime that would articulate clear norms and establish some clear and effective
enforcement mechanism(s) for them. This, we have not done at all.
In the extreme case where pre-trial disclosure of information can plausibly be
said to threaten the integrity of the trial, a defendant can seek to change venue
pre-tria 46 or, should he be convicted, can challenge the fairness of his trial.
47
42. See Matheson, supra note 40, at 889 ("Defense lawyers especially may suspect that an overzealous
prosecutor comments publicly to increase the probability of conviction by influencing prospective jurors .").
43. Id. at 888; Glaberson, supra note 39 ("In some cases, prosecutors are able to enhance their crime-fighting
image by reassuring the public that troubling cases are being investigated.").
44. Matheson, supra note 40, at 889.
45. See Hilary Rosenberg, The Deal Detectives, INsTrrtiONAL INVESTOR, May 1996, at 74; Joseph B. Treaster,
Gumshoes with White, N.Y. TnMEs, Aug. 29, 1997, at DI.
46. See FED. R. Cpmi. P. 21(a) (providing for change of venue "if the court is satisfied that there exists in the
district where the prosecution is pending so great a prejudice against the defendant that the defendant cannot
obtain a fair and impartial trial" in the district); see also United States v. Bailey, 112 F.3d 758, 769-70 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 240 (1997); United States v. Edmond, 52 F.3d 1080, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
47. The standard for overturning a conviction on grounds of prejudicial pretrial publicity can be quite high,
however. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1035 (1984) (holding that constitutional requirement of impartiality
does not require that jurors be ignorant of facts and issues of a case, but only that they not have such fixed opinions
that they cannot impartially judge the defendant's guilt); see also United States v. Croft, 124 F.3d 1109, 1115-16
(9th Cir. 1997) (stating that prejudice is presumed "when the adverse publicity is so pervasive and inflammatory
that the jurors cannot be believed when they assert that they can be impartial"); United States v. Smith-Bowman,
76 E3d 634, 637 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that defendant failed to demonstrate that "prejudicial publicity
rendered" it impossible "to obtain an impartial jury").
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While the standards for relief on these claims are quite high, the possibility of
success might well have some minimal deterrent effect on pre-trial investigative
disclosures. These standards, however, certainly do not provide any protection to
individuals who have the bad fortune to be tarred by investigative leaks, but the
good fortune not to be indicted.
Government lawyers are also bound by ethics rules that, in their most recent
formulation, provide (with certain stated exceptions):
A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or
litigation of a matter shall not make any extrajudicial statement that a
reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public
communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will
have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceed-
ing in the matter.48
These rules can be asserted against prosecutors and, at least in theory, can lead to
disciplinary proceedings against them.49 But they rarely (if ever) do-perhaps
because bar authorities properly expect the government to regulate its own shop.50
Their status regrettably may therefore be more hortatory than compulsory.
48. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 3.6 (1997). The Model Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity provides, with respect to statements made prior to the filing of charges:
A lawyer participating in or associated with the investigation of a criminal matter shall not make or
participate in making an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be dis-
seminated by means of public communication and that does more than state without elaboration:
(1) Information contained in the public record.
(2) That the investigation is in progress
(3) The general scope of the investigation, including a description of the offense and, if
permitted by law, the identity of the victim.
(4) A request for assistance in apprehending a suspect or assistance in other matters and
the information necessary thereto.
(5) A warning to the public of any dangers.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBmY DR 7-107(A) (1994).
49. All federal prosecutors are members of some bar, and are amenable to regulation in that capacity. Absent
further legislative action, they will also be "subject to State laws and rules, and local Federal court rules,
governing attorneys in each State where [they] engage... in [their] duties," under the "Citizens Protection Act of
1998," which was recently passed as part of the 1999 budget legislation. See Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 105-277 § 801 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 530B) (1998);
see also Congress Enacts Statute that Subjects Federal Prosecutors to State Laws and Rules, 64 Crim. L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 4, at 70-72 (Oct. 28, 1998). The possibility that Charles Bakaly III, Starr's press spokesman, might
face disciplinary action in addition to criminal prosecution for his alleged leaks, has been noted. Loose Lips,
LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 15, 1999, at 3.
50. See Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Produce Too Little
Enforcement?, 8 ST. THomAs L. REv. 69, 90 (1995) (observing that "even when state authorities learn of
accusations of prosecutorial wrongdoing, they are likely to decline to investigate as a matter of discretion").
Federal prosecutors are also subject to discipline by district court disciplinary committees, but these authorities
"view the state processes as the ordinary mechanism for dealing with wrongdoing by federal litigators, including
federal prosecutors." Id. at 84.
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What regulatory regime, then, has the Federal Government imposed on its
enforcers? The only rules broadly covering all forms of investigative information
can be found in the Justice Department's Manual. A provision therein flatly bars
"components and personnel of the Department" from "respond[ing] to questions
about the existence of an ongoing investigation or comment[ing] on its nature or
progress, including such things as the issuance or serving of a subpoena, prior to
the public filing of the document."'5 1 The Manual goes on to provide, however:
In matters that have already received substantial publicity, or about which
the community needs to be reassured that the appropriate law enforcement
agency is investigating the incident, or where release of information is
necessary to protect the public interest, safety, or welfare, comments about or
confirmation of an ongoing investigation may need to be made. In these
unusual circumstances, the involved investigative agency will consult and
obtain approval from the United States Attorney or Department Division
handling the matter prior to disseminating any information to the media.
5 2
As the recent controversy about Kenneth Starr demonstrated,5 3 this proviso
introduces a substantial degree of vagueness into the Department's regime.
Moreover, even were the Manual's regulations clear, their effectiveness would still
be open to question, since they are "intended for internal guidance only," and "do
not create any rights enforceable in law or otherwise by any party.", 54 Although
aggrieved parties are free to complain to the Department, investigation and
discipline are internal matters, handled, for the most part, by its famously opaque
Office of Professional Responsibility ("OPR"). 5
Only one category of investigative data has been given a separate statutory
secrecy regime to supplement the Justice Department's internal scheme: grand jury
material within the scope of Rule 6(e).56 Although, as has already been noted, Rule
6(e)'s contours are ill-defined in some important respects, the rule certainly bars
51. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DEP'T OF JUSTICE MANUAL, § 1-7.530(A) (1996).
52. Id. at § 1-7.530(B).
53. See Paul Elias, Media Starr: Did IC Break Ethical Rules?, TiE RECORDER, June 16, 1998, at 5; David E.
Rovella, Lies, Not Leaks, Real Starr Issue?, NAT'L LJ., June 29, 1998, at Al.
54. DEP'T OF JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 51, § 1-7.001.
55. See JIM MCGEE & BRIAN DUFFY, MAIN JUSTICE: THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO ENFORCE THE NATION'S
CRiMINAL LAWS AND GUARD rrs LIBERTIES 209-233, 263-77 (1996) (discussing OPR.); Green, supra note 50, at
84-86; see also James W. Fox, Jr., The Road Not Taken: Criminal Contempt Sanctions and Grand Jury Press
Leaks, 25 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 505, 511 (1992) (noting inadequacies of internal leak inquiries). The Justice
Department's Office of the Inspector General has some overlapping responsibilities in this area as well. See
Michael R. Bromwich, Running Special Investigations: The Inspector General Model, 86 GEo. L.J. 2027, 2029
(1998); Stuart Taylor, Jr., Watching the Detectives, AM. LAWYER, Oct. 1997, at 63.
Because OPR's investigations and reports are, for the most part, kept secret, it is impossible to assess the extent
of its efforts to enforce departmental regulations regarding investigative secrecy. Of course, some OPR inquiries
are less secret than others. See, e.g., David Johnston & Dan Van Natta, Jr., Reno Considering Separate Counselfor
StarrInquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1999 at Al; David Johnston & Dan Van Natta, Jr., Inquiry to Ask Whether Reno
was Misled by Starr's Office, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1999 at Al.
56. The Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22, creates a special secrecy regime for customer
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disclosure of testimony before the grand jury,57 and of information identifying the
targets of a grand jury's inquiry, or the witnesses who have testified, or who are
expected to testify.58 To the extent that the government's use of the grand jury
simply supplements other investigatory options, the protection offered by Rule
6(e) to targets and others is quite limited. Materials obtained through the execution
of a search warrant, for example, do not become "matters occurring before the
grand jury" simply because the government thereafter presents them to a grand
jury.59 But where the government pursues an investigation chiefly through the use
of the grand jury's subpoena power, as it often does in white-collar cases, Rule 6(e)
provides a heightened security classification for the entire inquiry.
Rule 6(e)'s categorical limitations on investigative disclosures are not only
substantially different from those in the Department's own regulations-lacking
the large "community reassurance" loophole-but they also are accompanied by
an enforcement mechanism that the Department's regulations lack. Rule 6(e)
specifically provides that a violation of its secrecy obligations is punishable as civil
or criminal contempt of court, and "the courts have recognized that that remedy is
an appropriate one."60 Although there remains some dispute whether Rule 6(e)
creates an independent private cause of action or merely puts a district court under
a duty to proceed upon an aggrieved party's complaint,61 the provision has
uniformly been read to permit a private party to initiate judicial review of the
government's conduct, upon making some threshold showing.62
records obtained from financial institutions which overlaps with, and in some respects, goes beyond Rule 6(e). See
B aA , ET AL., supra note 12, § 5:14, at 5-81 to 5-84.
57. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 123 F.3d 140, 154-55 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding Rule 6(e) applicable even
after initial disclosure of protected grand jury testimony); Durham v. Dep't of Justice, 829 F. Supp. 428, 432
(D.D.C. 1993) (holding grand jury testimony subject to Rule 6(e) requirements).
58. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 103 F.3d 234, 239 n.5 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding names of witnesses and
targets covered by Rule 6(e)); In re Eyecare Physicians of Am., 100 F.3d 514, 519 (7th Cir. 1996) (elaborating on
the consequences of disclosure of witness names).
59. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 920 F.2d 235, 241 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that separately obtained search
warrants coincident with grand jury investigation did not constitute "matters occurring before the grand jury").
60. BEALE, Er AL., supra note 12, § 5:4, at 5-14.
61. Compare In re Sealed Case, No. 98-3077, 151 F.3d 1059, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Starr leak allegations)
("[A] proceeding to enforce the secrecy mandate of Rule 6(e)(2) is civil in nature and may be initiated by a private
plaintiff."), and Blalock v. United States, 844 F.2d 1546, 1550 (11 th Cir. 1988) ("[Iln holding that a target may
seek civil contempt sanctions for a violation of Rule 6(e)(2), Lance stands for the proposition that a target may
bring suit for injunctive relief against the individuals subject to Rule 6(e)(2) and may invoke the district court's
contempt power to coerce compliance with any injunctive order the court grants.") (citing In re Grand Jury, 610
F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1980) (concerning Bert Lance)), with Finn v. Schiller, 72 F.3d 1182, 1189 (4th Cir. 1996)
("Because the victim of a breach of grand jury secrecy cannot bring suit on his or her own behalf, the district court
has an inherent duty to preserve the integrity of Rule 6 by instituting contempt proceedings when presented with a
primafacie case of a violation"), and McQueen v. United States, 5 E Supp.2d 473, 483 (S.D.Tex. 1998) (stating
grand jury target has no independent private right of action for damages or even equitable relief for a Rule 6(e)
violation).
62. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, No. 98-3077, 151 F.3d at 1067-68 (describing what prima facie case must
entail).
Dismissal of an indictment will rarely be an available remedy for a Rule 6(e) violation. See Bank of Nova
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Faced with President Clinton's leak allegations against Kenneth Starr's office,
the D.C. Circuit recently had occasion to set out the procedural steps of a district
court's Rule 6(e) contempt inquiry. Once an aggrieved party has satisfied its
burden of establishing a primafacie case that grand jury materials were improperly
released, the government must come forward with evidence to rebut that show-
ing.63 If, after an in camera review, the court determines that the government's ex
parte submission is insufficient to rebut the prima facie case, or if a violation is
conceded, "the district court may proceed to find that a Rule(e)(2) violation has
occurred and determine the appropriate remedy." '  If the court "finds that it
cannot make an adequate determination as to whether a violation of the rule has
occurred, or if the district court cannot identify with certainty the individual or
individuals responsible, further proceedings may be appropriate.", 65 The Circuit
suggested that a special master could be appointed for this task-a suggestion that
the district court supervising Kenneth Starr's grand jury soon adopted.66
If nothing else, the procedural costs that an aggrieved party can inflict on the
government through Rule 6(e) leak allegations are considerable. The costs are
particularly high because, in contrast to most pre-trial claims, these allegations will
often call for a personal response by prosecutors and agents forced to defend their
integrity before a district judge who may have a keen interest in pursuing
contemptuous conduct. Of course, procedural costs are really all that we are
talking about. Leak investigations, even those conducted by experts with the best
of intentions, are notoriously quixotic (in large part because investigators are
generally barred from pursuing the recipient of a leak and have to content
themselves with trying to identify the unnamed "government source"). Procedural
costs may be enough, though. The point is not that the Rule 6(e) enforcement
scheme is any more effective than the Justice Department's own scheme of internal
policing at identifying, punishing, and deterring leakers. But, unlike the departmen-
tal secrecy regulations, Rule 6(e) makes a court into the gatekeeper for leak
inquiries, and may actually require a judicial inquiry to be launched if a party can
make out aprimafacie case.67 In the hands of a deep-pocketed private party, of the
sort that is most likely to be involved in a sustained grand jury investigation, Rule
Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 256 (1988) (holding dismissal appropriate only " 'if it is established that the
violation substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict,' or if there is 'grave doubt' that the decision
to indict was free from the substantial influence of such violations") (quoting United States v. Mechanik. 475 U.S.
66, 78 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
63. In re Sealed Case, No. 98-3077, 151 F.3d at 1075.
64. Id. at 1076.
65. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. King, 94 Cr. 455 (LMM), 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4222, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
4, 1995) (finding record "insufficient" for determining whether Rule 6(e) violation occurred or even whether a
"Department of Justice investigation" should be ordered, court required prosecutors to question and obtain
affirmations from departmental personnel regarding alleged grand jury leaks).
66. See T.R. Goldman, Portrait of a Press Leak Investigator, LEC;AL T tms, Dec. 7, 1998, at 12.
67. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, No. 98-3077, 151 F3d at 1067; Barry v. United States, 865 F.2d 1317, 1321
(D.C. Cir. 1989); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 610 F.2d 202, 220 (5th Cir. 1980) (concerning Bert Lance).
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6(e) can thus be a potent weapon.68
Though one may have one's suspicions, it is impossible to determine whether
the possibility of Rule 6(e) inquiries actually results in a superior degree of
informational security69 for grand jury investigations or whether that provision
simply gives interested private parties a tactical weapon against the government
that alters the balance of power more generally. What is clear, however, is that this
avenue-whether of relief, deterrence, or procedural warfare-is open only to
those aggrieved by a disclosure from a grand jury investigation, and is therefore
one more open to white collar defendants than other defendants.
IV. RATIONALES FOR GRAND JURY SECRECY
The fact that a particular avenue of relief is reserved for defendants who, for the
most part, tend to be from more advantaged sectors of the population is not in itself
evidence of any unfairness, of course. It does, however, suggest the need for an
inquiry into the rationales for this effective discrimination. Why should matters
"occurring before the grand jury" effectively have a higher effective security
classification than other investigative data? Or, put differently, why should there be
a legislative effort to set rules (however under-enforced) in this area, but not
others?
There is a short answer to these questions. Rule 6(e) merely codified "the long
tradition of conducting grand jury proceedings in secret." 7° The historical re-
sponse is not sufficient, however. Even if one takes grand jury secrecy as a given,
one can still wonder why no there has been no parallel legislative effort to ensure
secrecy by statute outside the grand jury context.
In Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Oil Stops Northwest,7 1 the Supreme Court had
occasion to set out the rationales for grand jury secrecy:
(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2)
insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent
persons subject to indictment or their friends from importuning the grand
68. See, e.g., United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (concerning Oliver North); United
States v. Helmsley, 866 F.2d 19, 20 (2d Cir. 1988) (concerning Leona Helmsley); In re Grand Jury Investigation,
610 F.2d 202, 212 (5th Cir. 1980) (concerning Bert Lance); United States v. King, 94 Cr. 455 (LMM), 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 4222, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 1995) (concerning Don King).
69. See Roma W. Theus, II, "Leaks" in Federal Grand Jury Proceedings, 10 ST. THoMAs L. Rv. 551, 553
(1998) ("Although there is 'theoretically' a mechanism available that will permit the identification and
termination of 'leaks,' the mechanism is seldom effective."); see also Illinois v. F.E. Moran, Inc., 740 F.2d 533,
539 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.) ("So little is kept secret nowadays that... witnesses, jurors, or prosecutors
probably have no expectations of long-term secrecy.").
The perceived risk of leaks became so high during Kenneth Starr's investigation that the Drudge Report stated:
"Starr and his deputies have been secretly taking depositions from many witnesses who do not want the 'publicity
of the grand jury.' " Matt Drudge, Drudge Report, Sept. 7, 1998 <http:llwww.drudgereport.comlmatt.htm>.
70. BEALE, Er AL., supra note 12, § 5:2, at 5-5.
71. 441 U.S. 211 (1979).
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jurors; (3) to prevent subordination of perjury or tampering with the witness
who may testify before the grand jury and later appear at the trial of those
indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons
who have information with respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect
the innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has
been under investigation, and from the expense of standing trial where there
was no probability of guilt.
72
What is most noteworthy (for my purposes) about most of these rationales is that
few turn on the degree to which an investigation has been conducted in the grand
jury. While they certainly justify a broad regime of investigative secrecy, they thus
do not justify a heightened scrutiny for grand jury leaks in particular. Were, for
example, information that enforcers were pursuing an inquiry with search war-
rants, physical surveillance, or cooperating accomplices to leak out, a guilty target
would be equally liable to flee, obstruct the investigation, or "importune" the
grand jurors who will have to be impaneled to consider whether he should be
indicted. And an innocent target would suffer equal obloquy. Yet in such a case, an
aggrieved party could not complain under Rule 6(e), and would have to resort to
the Justice Department's internal processes.
This is not to say that a case can't be made for giving grand jury proceedings a
higher security classification. The level of coercion inherent in a grand jury
subpoena is extraordinary, and we allow many worthy causes to be swept before
it-privacy,73 freedom of the press, 74 even executive privilege. 75 Perhaps the
government should have some special obligation to protect a witness subject to
such coercion against the unwelcome disclosure of his testimony, and should have
a special duty of care with respect to this data that protects potential targets as
well.7 6 There are, however, some flaws in this rationale. The person who, under
threat of criminal charges or termination of employment, cooperates with the
government in an investigation centered outside the grand jury has also been
coerced, in a sense. Indeed, he probably was threatened with far more serious
charges than civil (or criminal) contempt. Why isn't he owed a similar duty of
care? And what about the person who gives information without having been
subpoenaed, because she knows the government has coercive subpoena power?
72. Id. at 219 n.10 (quoting United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954)).
73. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9 (1973) (holding subpoena to appear before a grand jury "is not
a 'seizure' in the Fourth Amendment sense").
74. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (requiring newspaper reporters testify before grand jury).
75. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (requiring production of documents to grand jury despite
claim of executive privilege).
76. The compulsion rationale argues for treating the interview that a witness has with a prosecutor before
going into the grand jury as falling within the scope of Rule 6(e), if the witness would not have voluntarily met
with the prosecutor in the absence of a grand jury subpoena. See, e.g., In re Spec. Feb. 1975 Grand Jury (Baggot),
662 F.2d 1232, 1240 (7th Cir. 198 1) (holding that a preliminary interview can be subject to Rule 6(e)), affd, 463
U.S. 476 (1983).
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A focus on compulsion per se as a secrecy rationale thus has its limits. After all,
we rarely recognize the right to confidentiality of people compelled to give
testimony at criminal trials, however embarrassing the subject matter may be.77
But the public interest in open trials may be a trump here. Moreover, once other
features of a grand jury appearance are considered, the compulsion argument has a
lot more force. The testimony a subpoenaed witness will be obliged to give will not
be bound by the relevance limits of a trial. 78 Nor will a judge preside at a
proceeding in which the witness may be "questioned vigorously, maybe even
browbeaten, without counsel present. , 79 These circumstances might well combine
to make a grand jury witness more vulnerable to injury, and more deserving of
protection, than someone who merely visits a prosecutor's office, or testifies at a
trial presided over by a judge. For similar reasons, the leaking of sworn grand jury
testimony given in a formal proceeding may inflict special harm on those named in it.'
One might also make something of a structural argument: The agent or
prosecutor who leaks, say, search warrant information for his own private ends has
surely breached a fiduciary duty to the government.81 Yet when he leaks in order to
accomplish some law enforcement end ("tickling a wire," defending the govern-
ment against unfair criticism, etc.), and may even have been authorized to leak by a
superior, there arguably is no such breach. The same cannot be said when the leak
is of information obtained via grand jury subpoena, however.82 As the Supreme
Court has noted, the grand jury "belongs to no branch of the institutional
government, serving as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and the
people."8a3 Of course, this rhetoric masks a reality of prosecutorial domination.
Having so often profited from the fiction of grand jury independence, however,
enforcers should not be heard to complain when the fiction is asserted to justify
imposing a heightened secrecy duty on them.
77. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 7 (1986) (noting that the "right to an open public
trial is a shared right of the accused and the public"); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308,
310-11 (1977) (holding press could not be enjoined from reporting on eleven-year-old when reporters legitimately
obtained information).
78. See United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 298 (1991) ("Many of the rules and restrictions that
apply at a trial do not apply in grand jury proceedings.").
79. Illinois v. F.E. Moran, Inc., 740 F.2d 533, 540 (7th Cir. 1984).
80. Judge Friendly observed that the tradition of grand jury secrecy rests, in part, on
the interest of a witness against the disclosure of testimony of others which he has had no
opportunity to cross-examine or rebut, or of his own testimony on matters which may be irrelevant
or where he may have been subjected to prosecutorial brow-beating without the protection of
counsel; [and] the similar interests of other persons who may have been unfavorably mentioned by
grand jury witnesses or in questions of the prosecutor....
In re Biaggi, 478 F.2d 489,491 (2d Cir. 1973).
81. Cf. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 510 (1980) (finding that former CIA agent "breached a fiduciary
obligation" when he failed to comply with agency's secrecy regime).
82. l owe this point (and many others) to Jerry Lynch.
83. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992).
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These arguments for a regime targeting only grand jury leaks do have some
force, at least when considered together. But the realities that limit the investiga-
tive use of grand juries chiefly to settings in which institutions and entities respond
to the moderate coercion of a subpoena should force us to confront some tough
questions: Does it make sense to have a system that in effect shows a special
solicitude for targets and witnesses in white collar cases? Aren't these, in fact, the
cases where, in the face of efforts by well-financed lawyers to impede information
collection,8 the government is most in need of options that might include the
selective dissemination of investigative data? One can also argue that the need for
prosecutors to defend an investigation to the public while it is on-going is likely to
be greater in white-collar than in other contexts. After all, white collar targets are
far better able to marshal support in the press and elsewhere than other targets-
support that may impede the progress of an investigation and/or sway the potential
jury pool.85 And, because white-collar crimes are more likely to be malum
prohibitum than malum in se, targets find it easier to defend their alleged conduct,
or at least argue that it ought not be pursued criminally.
V. JUSTIFYING DisPARATE TREATMENT
Having suggested what a debate on grand jury secrecy might look like, I have no
intention of resolving these questions. I wish only to note that no such debate has
ever occurred. Two possible explanations for this silence come to mind. One is that
the current rules, however historically contingent, are basically right. Perhaps the
theoretical justifications for a regime that gives special avenues of relief to the
victims of grand jury leaks, but not to those aggrieved by other sorts of investiga-
tive leaks, are compelling. Or maybe, irrespective of these theoretical points, we
simply think that grand jury targets and witnesses are more worthy of protection
because they exist within institutional frameworks that respond to the moderate
level of coercion offered by grand jury subpoenae. Because of their standing, these
people suffer greater reputational losses when coerced testimony or targeting is
disclosed. Maybe they are even more likely to be the subject of investigative leaks,
since their status gives the media more of a reason to seek out such information,
84. See Mann, supra note 35; Pamela S. Karlan, Discrete and Relational Criminal Representation: The
Changing Vision of the Right to Counsel, 105 HAtv. L. REv. 670, 671 (1992) ("[T]he decision to retain counsel,
particularly when it antedates the initiation of formal criminal proceedings and involves an ongoing attorney-
client relationship, may in fact be integrally related to the successful commission and concealment of the crime
itself."); cf. David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MicH. L. REv. 1729, 1765 (1993) (arguing that
ethical arguments justifying aggressive defense tactics against powerful state may not fully extend to "the
high-priced hired guns").
85. One has only to look at the efforts of Michael Milken, Leona Helmsley, and President Clinton. See, e.g.,
Steve Johnson, Where There's a Hard Sell, There's a Publicist, C. Thin., Apr. 24, 1989, at 1; John Riley,
Pro-Milken Propaganda: While Lawyers Build a Courtroom Case, PR Experts Polish His Tarnished Image,
NEWSDAY, May 15, 1989, City Bus. sec., at 1.
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and their non-violent proclivities make enforcers less worried about investigative
security.
The other explanation would, if at all true, be far more troubling: that Rule 6(e)'s
statutory secrecy regime, and the absence of a similar regime outside the grand
jury context (or even a debate about whether one is needed) reflect the difference in
the political clout of the affected individuals and entities.8 6 The parties with the
political power to demand investigative secrecy have been given some assurances
in that direction in the form of Rule 6(e). Everyone else has to settle for vague
departmental regulations. With its questionable focus on what happens in the grand
jury, Rule 6(e) has thus obviated the need for a general discussion about what
secrecy rules should govern prosecutors across the board, and how they should be
enforced.
Were legislators to think about the first principles of investigative secrecy, and
ask whether the same arguments used to justify Rule 6(e) can also be made outside
the grand jury context, the process would be fruitful. One result might be the
enactment of a statutory regime for purely prosecutorial investigations that would
complement Rule 6(e). Such legislation would also strengthen Rule 6(e) by
making it hard for enforcers to claim that an investigative leak was based on
information obtained via say, a search warrant, as opposed to a grand jury
subpoena.
87
Regardless of what legislation is produced, open debate on investigative secrecy
would serve another purpose as well. Enforcement of any secrecy rules will always
be difficult. As President Nixon discovered, even the most zealous plumbers will
rarely be able to fix leaks or identify leakers. Our experience with Rule 6(e) has not
suggested otherwise, and, unless we start polygraphing reporters (something I am
not recommending), it is not likely to do so in the future. Real improvement in
investigative security will likely come only if prosecutors and agents internalize
secrecy norms better, and thereby make enforcement less necessary. Perhaps
sustained legislative attention might at least accomplish that, by requiring enforc-
ers, legislators, and other interested parties to spell out what interests need to be
protected, and why.
86. See Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion,
46 UCLA L. REv. 757 (1999) (exploring political economy of federal criminal law).
87. See James A. Rothschild, The Erosion of Grand Jury Secrecy: Using Search Warrants to Avoid Restrictions
on the Disclosure of Documentary Evidence for Civil Purposes, 7 CraM. JusTIcE, No. 3, at 23 (Fall 1992).
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